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I. INTRODUCTION
In Anglo-American law, Krell v. Henry,1 otherwise known as
the coronation case, is arguably the most important case in the
development of the law of force majeure and frustration.2 In 1903,
an English court held that a contract for the leasing of a room to
watch King Edward VII’s coronation procession was discharged
when the coronation was cancelled because of the king’s illness.3
Ever since that case, a contract is discharged under English law if
the common purpose of the contracting parties is frustrated by a
supervening event. Fast-forward a century and the doctrine of
force majeure which developed from the coronation case is playing
a significant role in resolving contractual disputes resulting from,
coincidentally, the coronavirus (“COVID-19”) pandemic. Compared
with most disasters in the world’s history, the COVID-19 pandemic
is arguably the most international as no countries are immune
from it. The international character of COVID-19 therefore makes
private international law an essential component of the force
majeure analysis. This Article aims to facilitate the understanding
of the interlocking nature of COVID-19, force majeure, and private
international law, and seeks to analyze the private international
*Associate Professor, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, S.J.D. (Georgetown),
LL.M., J.D. (Columbia). This work was generously supported by the Direct Grant for Research
from the Faculty of Law of The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
1. Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (Eng.).
2 . Strictly speaking, force majeure is not a common law concept but is used to
describe clauses that excuse a party from certain specified supervening events. The
equivalent doctrine under English law is frustration of contract. See Ewan McKendrick,
Force majeure and Frustration – Their Relationship and A Comparative Assessment, in FORCE
MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT 33 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 2d ed. 1995). However,
because this Article covers more than just English law and the wide use of force majeure
commercially, the term force majeure will be used generally to cover frustration as
appropriate.
3. See Krell, 2 K.B. 740.
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law issues that are expected to arise in COVID-19 related force
majeure cases. As both force majeure and private international law
are national laws, this Article illustrates the relevant issues by
comparing both sets of laws between England, the place of origin
of modern force majeure law and frustration in common law
jurisdictions, and China, the jurisdiction that has the most
experience in dealing with force majeure related to coronavirus.
A. Why is COVID-19 Different From Other Force Majeure Events?
Four aspects distinguish COVID-19 from other historical force
majeure events. The first and most obvious aspect is its huge
economic impact. As of October 4, 2020, there were over 34.8
million confirmed cases of COVID-19 infection, with the death toll
reaching more than 1 million.4 According to the latest projection
by the International Monetary Fund (the “IMF”), global output in
2020 will contract by 4.9 percent.5 With no end to the pandemic in
sight, it is not possible to estimate the eventual economic loss at
this point in time. As the primary function of force majeure is to
allocate the loss caused by a supervening event between the
contracting parties,6 the bigger the loss from COVID-19, the more
important the law on force majeure becomes.
The second aspect is the strong public interest present in
COVID-19 related force majeure cases. Insofar as English law is
concerned, force majeure is meant to do justice to the contracting
parties.7 As Lord Sumner famously put it, the doctrine is a device
“by which the rules as to absolute contracts are reconciled with a
4. Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) Weekly Epidemiological Update, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION [WHO], (Oct. 4, 2020, 10:00 CEST), https://www.who.int/docs/defaultsource/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20201005-weekly-epi-update-8.pdf.
5 . IMF, A Crisis Like No Other, An Uncertain Recovery, World Economic Outlook
Update,
(June
2020),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/06/24/WEOUpdateJune2020.
Comparatively, the global financial crisis triggered by the implosion of sub-prime
mortgages led to only about a 4 percent of contraction in the world’s economy between
2008 and 2009. See Renae Merle, A guide to the financial crisis — 10 years later,
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2018) (“[i]n all, the Great Recession led to a loss of more than
$2 trillion in global economic growth, or a drop of nearly 4 percent, between the prerecession peak in the second quarter of 2008 and the low hit in the first quarter of 2009,
according to Moody’s Analytics.”).
6. See G.H. TREITEL, FRUSTRATION AND FORCE MAJEURE 503 (3d ed. 2014).
7. See id. at 643-44.
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special exception which justice demands.”8 However, third parties
are certainly affected by the resolution of the force majeure issue
in this pandemic. For example, in Lakeman v. Pollard, the issue was
whether a defendant could be discharged from working in the
vicinity of a prevailing epidemic, and the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine held that if the performance of contract was rendered
impossible by the epidemic, the defendant would be discharged.9
Although the court focused on the impacts that upholding the
contract would have on the employee,10 the decision can also be
justified on the basis of public interest “for the reason that the state
cannot risk the loss of its citizens even to preserve inviolate the
contracts of individuals.” 11 In other words, upholding the
employment contract and making the defendant go to work would
not only put the defendant at risk of contracting the virus, but also
expose other employees as well as put the public at risk.
The third aspect relates to the second as such public interests
rise to a national level in this pandemic. Because of the significant
negative impacts of COVID-19 on all countries in the world, each
country has a strong national interest in the law of force majeure.
This is reflected in various laws passed specifically on force
majeure by many countries regarding COVID-19,12 as well as other
COVID-19-related laws like the measures on quarantine and
lockdowns. 13 Traditionally, as a contractual doctrine, strong
involvement of the State is alien to the law of force majeure. 14
8. Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue Steamship Co. Ltd. [1926] A.C. 497, 510 (P.C.).
9. Lakeman v. Pollard, 43 Me. 463, 467 (1857).
10. Stating in no uncertain terms, the court made it clear that “[i]f the fulfillment of
the plaintiff’s contract became impossible by the act of God, the obligation to perform it
was discharged . . . The plaintiff was under no obligation to imperil his life by remaining at
work in the vicinity of a prevailing epidemic so dangerous in its character that a man of
ordinary care and prudence, in the exercise of those qualities, would have been justified in
leaving by reason of it, nor does it make any difference that the men who remained there
at work after the plaintiff left were healthy, and continued to be so.” Id.
11. Contracts – Defenses – Impossibility of Performance, 17 HARV. L. REV. 197, 200
(1904).
12. See infra notes 91-101 and accompanying texts.
13. See, e.g., Interim Measures for the Prevention and Control of Pneumonia Outbreak
of Novel Coronavirus Infection in Wuhan, NAT’L HEALTH COMM’N OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA
(Jan.
29,
2020),
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/xcs/fkdt/202001/7bde2706a5614338b106362ac161ddaa.shtm
l [https://perma.cc/58RG-XCNZ].
14. See supra notes 7 and 8.
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However, given the severity of COVID-19, the manner in which
disrupted commercial transactions are handled by force majeure
may affect the survival of a government. 15 There is thus a
significant incentive for states to get involved in private
transactions through the force majeure doctrine to protect their
national interests. COVID-19 could thus turn the law on loss
allocation between private parties into the law on loss allocation
between countries. It is expected that states like China, which has
a large share of its economy in the hands of state-owned
enterprises, will have an even stronger incentive than other states
to shape their force majeure laws in their favor.
The final aspect is the international nature of COVID-19. The
global reach of COVID-19 is unprecedented and greatly
contributed to the scale of the disaster, but the international nature
goes beyond that. The severity of the pandemic is closely related to
modern international transportation and commerce through
which the virus spreads,16 and in turn COVID-19 also causes huge
disruptions to the same international transportation and
commerce. 17 Cross-border force majeure issues arising from
COVID-19 therefore require analysis of private international law.
B. Why Does Force Majeure From COVID-19 Cause Unique Private
International Law Issues?
Force majeure has never attracted much attention from the
perspective of private international law. For example, in a leading
textbook written on force majeure and frustration by Professor
Treitel, only one page discusses private international law, and it
mostly just refers readers to specialty works like Dicey, Morris &
15. In this sense, COVID-19 imposes threats to the survival of a government much
like those imposed by wars. See TREITEL, supra note 6, at 348 (“The public policy
considerations on which the prohibition against trading with the enemy are based are of
exceptional strength because observance of this prohibition can affect the very survival of
the nation.”).
16. See Matteo Chinazzi et al., The effect of travel restrictions on the spread of the 2019
novel coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak, 368 SCIENCE 395, 395-400 (2020).
17. Various countries have imposed travel restrictions as a result. For example, Japan
has imposed a travel ban on foreigners from more than 100 countries. See Border
enforcement measures to prevent the spread of novel coronavirus (COVID-19), MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
OF
JAPAN
(Aug.
13,
2020),
https://www.mofa.go.jp/ca/fna/page4e_001053.html [https://perma.cc/53VQ=GZHD].

192

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:1

Collins on The Conflict of Laws. 18 However, Dicey, Morris and
Collins also have very limited discussions on the topic.19 The lack
of discussion is a bit surprising considering that international trade
has long been subject to various kinds of force majeure events,
though not on the scale of COVID-19. As will be discussed below,
one explanation is the belief that frustration is just another
contractual principle that could be handled by the general choice
of law rules on contracts.20 This may have been correct pre-COVID19, but this is no longer true.
First, as mentioned above, there is a significant national
interest in force majeure regarding COVID-19. Similar to the law on
force majeure, private international law has traditionally been
perceived as a means of achieving justice between private parties,
not generally for dealing with relationships between countries.21
The national interests in COVID-19-caused force majeure disputes
therefore bring new challenges to private international law,
particularly in public policy and mandatory rules. In addition, the
increased number of disputes due to COVID-19 also provides
courts with the opportunity to apply foreign force majeure laws,
which they had no experience applying. These foreign laws also
include new COVID-19-specific laws which could serve to widen
the differences between foreign force majeure laws and those of
the forum, creating “true conflicts” that had not been seen preCOVID-19.22

18 . See TREITEL, supra note 6, at 390 (“[f]or detailed discussion of the relevant
Conflicts rules [on illegality], reference should be made to the specialist works on that
subject.”). References were made to DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Lord
Collins of Mapesbury et al. eds., 15th ed. 2012) and CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT: PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (J.J. Fawcett & Janeen M. Carruthers eds., 14th ed. 2008).
19. For example, the term “frustration” appears in the latest edition only twelve
times. See DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 18, at ¶¶ 16-022, 32-026, 32-027, 32-050,
32-092, 32-124, 32-151, 32-156, 32-162, 34-016, 36-023 (with the word appearing twice
in this paragraph).
20. See infra Part III(D); see also McKendrick, supra note 2 (discussing “frustration”).
21 . See ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW:
JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERING OF
PRIVATE LAW 3-10 (2009).
22. See infra note 24 regarding false conflict generally.
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C. Why Compare Both the Substantive Laws and Private
International Laws on Force Majeure?
Private international law, particularly choice of law rules, is
closely related to the substantive laws.23 To assess and illustrate
the impact of COVID-19 on force majeure, this Article will make two
comparisons between England and China. The first is a comparison
of the two countries’ substantive force majeure law. The second is
a comparison of the two countries’ private international law rules
applied to force majeure issues. While the emphasis of this Article
is on the second comparison, such a comparison is not possible
without conducting the first comparison. This is because there will
be no meaningful need for a choice of law analysis if the
substantive laws are essentially the same and lead to an identical
result (in other words, a “false conflict”). 24 However, the first
comparison will only highlight those key differences with a
particular significance on the conflict analysis.
England and China are ideal subjects of comparison. England
is representative of the common law jurisdictions and serves as a
striking contrast to the civil law system of China. 25 In addition,
while England has had a century-long history of force majeure,
China has more experience dealing with force majeure caused by
coronaviruses. In 2003, China experienced an epidemic caused by
another coronavirus, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(“SARS”). 26 At the time, the Supreme People’s Court (the “SPC”)
issued a special judicial interpretation to deal with force majeure

23. See CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT’S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (Paul Torremans
eds., 15th ed. 2017) (stating that the function of choice of law is to choose the appropriate
system of law and not to furnish a direct solution).
24. See generally Peter K. Westen, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 74, 76-77 (1967)
(in particular, the author identified seven different types of false conflicts. The false conflict
referred to in this article is the second type, i.e. “[c]ases in which the laws of two states,
though different, yield identical results with respect to the specific issue before the
court”.).
25. See John D. Wladis, Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development of the
Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance in English Contract Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1575, 157576 (1987) on the impacts of English law of frustration on US law.
26. See China’s latest SARS outbreak has been contained, but biosafety concerns remain
– Update 7, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], (May 18, 2004),
https://www.who.int/csr/don/2004_05_18a/en/ [https://perma.cc/8YQS-6NM9].
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issues resulting from SARS. 27 Chinese courts also decided a
number of cases regarding such disputes.28 In 2019, China was also
the first country to be significantly affected by COVID-19. 29 The
SPC promulgated three judicial interpretations between April and
June of 2020 which focus on force majeure caused by COVID-19
(“Guidances”). 30 In terms of the national interests highlighted
above, China has arguably more substantial national interests than

27. Zuìgāo fǎyuàn: Guānyú zài fángzhì chuánrǎn xìng fēidiǎn xíng fèiyán qíjiān yīfǎ
zuò hǎo rénmín fǎyuàn xiāngguān shěnpàn zhíxíng gōngzuò de tōngzhī (最高法院：关于
在防治传染性非典型肺炎期间依法做好人民法院相关审判执行工作的通知) [Notice of
the Supreme People’s Court on Handling of the Trial and Implementation of the People’s
Court in pursuant to the law during the prevention and treatment of SARS] (promulgated
by the Sup. People’s Ct., effective June 11, 2003).
28. See, e.g., Měiguó dōngjiāng lǚyóu jítuán gōngsī (J) yǔ chángjiāng lúnchuán hǎiwài
lǚyóu zǒng gōngsī chuánbó zūlìn hétóng jiūfēn shàngsù àn (美国东江旅游集团公司（J）
与长江轮船海外旅游总公司船舶租赁合同纠纷上诉案) [Appeal Case for Ship Leasing
Contract Disputes between J.PI Travel U.S.A., Inc. and Yangtze River Shipping Overseas
Tourism Corporation], (Higher People’s Ct. of Hubei Province 2007) (China).
29 . See Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Situation report - 1, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION
[WHO]
(Jan.
21,
2020),
https://www.who.int/docs/defaultsource/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200121-sitrep-1-2019ncov.pdf?sfvrsn=20a99c10_4 [https://perma.cc/AQ5K-RVDN]. The Author takes no
position on the cause or country of origin of COVID-19.
30. See Zuì gāo rén mín fayuàn yìnfā “guānyú yīfa tuoshàn bànli shè xīnguān fèiyán
yìqíng zhí xíng ànjiàn ruò gàn wèntí de zhidao yì jiàn” de tōngzhī (Fa fā [2020] 16 hào) (最
⾼⼈民法院印发《关于依法妥善办理涉新冠肺炎疫情执⾏ 案件若⼲问题的指导意⻅》
的通知(法发〔2020〕16 号))[Notice by the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing the
Guiding Opinions on Several issues Concerning Properly Handling Enforcement Cases
Involving the COVID-19 Outbreak According to Law, No. 16 [2020]] (promulgated by the
Sup. People’s Ct., effective May 13, 2020) (“Guidance I”); Zuì gāo rén mín fayuàn yìnfā
“guānyú yīfa tuoshàn shenli shè xīnguān fèiyán yìqíng minshi ànjiàn ruògān wèntí de zhi
dao yìjiàn (èr)” de tōngzhī (Fa fā [2020] 17 hào), (最高人民法院印发《关于依法妥善审理
涉新冠肺炎疫情民事案件若干问题的指 导意见(二)》的通知 (法发〔2020〕17 号
))[Circular of the Supreme People’s Court on the Promulgation of the Guiding Opinions of
the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning Properly Handling Civil Cases
Related to COVID-19 Epidemic in Accordance with the Law (II), No. 17 [2020]]
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., effective May 15, 2020) (“Guidance II”); Zuìgāo
rénmín fayuàn yìnfā “guānyú yīfa tuoshàn shenli shè xīnguān fèiyán yìqíng minshi ànjiàn
ruògān wèntí de zhi dao yìjiàn (sān)” de tōngzhī (Fa fā [2020] 20 hào) (最高人民法院印发
《关于依法妥善审理涉 新冠肺炎疫情民事案件若干问题的指导意 见(三)》的通知 (法发
〔2020〕20 号)) [Notice by the Supreme People’s Court of Issuing the Guiding Opinions
on Several Issues of Properly Hearing Civil Cases Involving the COVID-19 Pandemic (III),
No. 20 [2020]] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., effective June 8, 2020) (“Guidance
III”).
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other countries in this pandemic since it has a large number of
large state-owned enterprises.31
With respect to the second comparison regarding private
international law rules as applicable to force majeure issues,
England follows the European Union’s private international law
regime, which contrasts in significant ways with the Chinese
private international law regime.32 The comparison will therefore
equally apply to a case between China and any EU member state.
Both countries also have plenty of commercial transactions with
each other.33
II. COMPARISON OF FORCE MAJEURE SUBSTANTIVE LAWS
A. English Law
In England, the doctrine of frustration can be understood as
an exception to the doctrine of absolute contracts. Under the latter
doctrine, a contracting party is required to perform the agreedupon bargain even though it has been made impossible by a
supervening event that is out of its control.34 The landmark case
that developed the exception of frustration was Taylor v.
Caldwell.35 In that case, the plaintiff contracted to host concerts at
the defendant’s music hall which was destroyed by fire before the
dates of the concerts.36 The English court held that the parties were
discharged from their respective obligations due to “the
31. See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and
the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665, 676-78 (2015).
32. The Chinese regime seems to be influenced significantly by the EU regime, as
well. See generally Guangjian Tu, China’s New Conflicts Code: General Issues and Selected
Topics, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 563 (2011) (comparing the Chinese choice of law regime with
Rome I Regulation throughout the article).
33. The United Kingdom (“UK”) was the third largest trading partner of China in
Europe in 2018. See Total Value of Imports and Exports by Country (Region) of Origin/
Destination, NAT’L BUREAU OF STAT. OF CHINA, CHINA STAT. YEARBOOK (2019),
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/indexeh.htm [https://perma.cc/9P87-DSL8].
China was the UK’s sixth largest export market and fourth largest source of imports in
2019. See House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, Statistics on UK trade with China,
Number 7379 (July 14, 2020), https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/researchbriefings/cbp-7379/[https://perma.cc/UH4X-XK4X] .
34. See Paradine v. Jane [1647] Eng. Rep. 82 Aleyn 26.
35. Taylor v. Caldwell [1863] Rev. Rep. 3 B. & S. 826.
36. Id. at 826.
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impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the
person or thing.”37
Krell v. Henry was arguably even more important, as it pushed
the boundary of the doctrine further than impossibility.
Frustration will happen if performance of the contract becomes
impossible “by reason of the non-existence of the state of things
assumed by both contracting parties as the foundation of the
contract . . . [in that case,] there will be no breach of the contract . . .
”38 Impossibility in that case was not necessary. The contract in the
case could still be performed, as the plaintiff could rent the room
to the defendant for the relevant dates.39 The issue was simply that
the room could no longer be used for the purpose of watching the
coronation, a purpose that was not written in the contract, but
understood clearly by both parties.40
The change in the judicial approach from absolute contracts
to frustration is reflected in two English cases dealing with
diseases. Prior to Taylor, in Barker v. Hodgson, 41 despite the
impossibility of the defendant loading the cargo onto a ship
chartered by the plaintiff due to a health law implemented due to
a pestilence that shut down the “public intercourse and
communication” in the port, the court held that the defendant was
not discharged by the impossibility.42 The position changed after
Taylor: in Condor v. The Barron Knights, 43 the court held that
employee, a talented drummer of a band, was properly discharged
from the contract due to an illness he suffered. 44 The court
reasoned that his illness was such “that had in a business sense
made it impossible for him to continue to perform or for the
[employer] have him perform the terms of the contract as a
member of their group.”45
However, it should be noted that the English courts have long
accepted, even before Taylor, an exception to the doctrine of
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 839.
Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 K.B. 740, 749 (Eng.).
See TREITEL, supra note 6, at 53, 313.
Id.; see also Wladis supra note 25, at 1611.
Barker v. Hodgson [1814] 105 Eng. Rep. 612, 3 M. & S. 267.
Id. at 270.
Condor v. The Barron Knights [1966] 1 W.L.R. 87 (Eng.).
Id.
Id. at 91. For an American example, see Lakeman v. Pollard 43 Me. 463 (1857).

2020]

FROM CORONATION TO CORONAVIRUS

197

absolute contracts if the supervening event involved illegality. 46
Thus, in Barker v. Hodgson, the court explained that the defendant
would have been excused if the covenant itself had been prohibited
by law. 47 This exception has also been extended to cover
supervening illegality under the law of the place of performance.48
The lower threshold for illegality may be justified as “the court is
concerned, not merely with reaching a solution which may do
justice between the contracting parties, but also with the public
interest in seeing that the law is observed; and this public interest
may sometimes outweigh the private interests of the parties.”49
Even with the breakthrough brought by Krell v. Henry, English
law has generally adopted a strict approach in discharging
contracts based on frustration. 50 Notably, it does not have an
equivalent doctrine of impracticability found under US law. 51 In
the leading American case on impracticability, Mineral Park Land
Co. v. Howard,52 the defendants, who agreed to extract gravel from
the plaintiff’s land, did not take the gravel below water level as the
costs of such extraction would have been ten to twelve times
higher.53 The Supreme Court of California found the contract to be
impracticable, saying that “a thing is impossible in legal
contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is
impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive and
unreasonable cost.” 54 Accordingly, a contract may be discharged
for impracticability even though it was neither impossible nor was
its common purpose frustrated. Mineral Park has been widely cited
in later authorities in the United States. 55 The UCC which
synthesized the common law development has subsequently
adopted the use of impracticability instead of impossibility.56 This

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

TREITEL, supra note 6, at 28-30.
Barker, 3 M. & S. at 270.
Ralli Bros v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 K.B. 287 (Eng.).
TREITEL, supra note 6, at 346.
See Wladis, supra note 25, at 1620-29.
See TREITEL, supra note 6, at 274-83.
Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916).
Id. at 459.
Id. at 460.
TREITEL, supra note 6, at 257.
See U.C.C. § 2-615 (Am. L. Inst. & Unif. L. Comm’n 1951).
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is not an innovation of the UCC as it is observed that US courts do
not insist on strict impossibility.57
If a frustration case is established under English law, the
remedy is the discharge of both parties’ obligations from the time
of the frustrating event. 58 This “all-or-nothing” remedy could be
harsh, so it was mitigated by the Law Reform (Frustrated
Contracts) Act 1943, which allows a party to recover a “just sum”
of expenses in appropriate cases. 59 In short, two important
functions are served by the frustration doctrine: first, it sets out the
type of supervening event that could trigger the doctrine; and
second, it provides for a set remedy in successful cases for proper
loss distribution.
English law also allows the parties to change these default
functions by contract. Parties can by agreement make it easier or
more difficult to discharge a contract, and can provide for different
remedies beyond discharge.60 They can include a clause to provide
for force majeure events, which would not constitute impossibility
or frustration of common purpose in its absence.61 This is known
as the force majeure clause under English law.62 Conversely, a party
may also expressly assume the risk of a force majeure event so that
its eventual happening will not discharge the obligation and thus
the liability of the said party. 63 These force majeure clauses are
very common.64 English courts have long accepted that parties will
include and rely on a force majeure clause.65 As “[u]ncertainty . . . is
inherent in the doctrine of frustration,” 66 it is believed that such
57. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 627 (4th ed. 2004).
58. See Taylor v Caldwell (1863) Rev. Rep. 3 B. & S. 826, 840.
59. See Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, s. 1(3); see also TREITEL, supra
note 6, at 602-08.
60. See TREITEL, supra note 6, at 449.
61. See id. at 449, 468.
62. Id.; see also McKendrick, supra note 2, at 34-35.
63. See Joseph Constantine SS Line Ltd. V. Imperial Smelting Co. Ltd. [1942] AC 154.
64. See William Swadling, The Judicial Construction of Force Majeure Clauses, in FORCE
MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT 3, 4-5 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 2nd ed. 1995) (“[i]n
many cases the promisor may be especially unwilling to accept the risk of events over
which he has no control and a contract may typically provide . . . [for] force majeure
clauses.”).
65 . See Paradine v. Jane (1647) Eng. Rep. 82 Aleyn 26 (justifying the absolute
contracts doctrine “because [the defendant] might have provided against it by his
contract”).
66. McKendrick, supra note 2, at 39.
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clauses could reduce the uncertainty of identifying frustrating
events.67 Force majeure clauses also afford more flexibility to the
rigid remedy under frustration. For example, parties often provide
for extension or adjustment as consideration in the force majeure
clause.68 Whether these clauses will apply to a given situation will
be a matter of interpretation by the courts, which has traditionally
been conducted rather narrowly.69
B.

Chinese Law

The doctrine of force majeure has existed since 1986 when the
General Principle of Civil Law (the “GPCL”) was passed.70 It adopts
the French terminology of force majeure and largely reflects the
requirements of its French counterparts. 71 To qualify for a force
majeure event, the event must be unforeseeable, unavoidable and
insurmountable.72 This definition has been adopted by Article 117
of the Chinese Contract Law (the “CCL”), which was promulgated
in 1999.73 Perhaps influenced by English law, it is observed that the
CCL further requires the force majeure event to have frustrated the
common purpose in order to discharge a contract under Article
94(1). 74 The Chinese law, however, is different from the English
law in the following aspects:

67. Id.
68. See TREITEL, supra note 6, at 449; see also Michael Furmston, Drafting of Force
Majeure Clause – Some General Guidelines, in FORCE MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT
57, 61 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 2nd ed. 1995).
69. Id. at 476.
70. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze (中华人民共和国民法通则) [The
General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by
President, Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan 1, 1987), arts. 106, 107 and 153 [hereinafter GPCL];
see also Lester Ross, Force majeure and Related Doctrines of Excuse in Contract Law of the
People’s Republic of China, 5 J. CHINESE L. 58, 69-70 (1991).
71. See Ross, supra note 70, at 68.
72. See GPCL, at art. 153. For requirements under French law, see Barry Nicholas,
Force Majeure in French Law, in FORCE MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT 24 (Ewan
McKendrick ed., 2d ed. 1995) (“[i]n order to constitute force majeure an event . . . must
have been (a) irresistible, (b) unforeseeable, and (c) external to the debtor, and must (d)
have made performance impossible and not merely more onerous or difficult”).
73. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetong Fa (中華人民共和國合同法) [Contract Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by The Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 1999,
effective Oct. 10, 2001), art. 117 [hereinafter CCL].
74. Id. at art. 94(1).
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1. Supervening events
Technically, force majeure under Chinese law is more difficult
to trigger. As mentioned above,75 unforeseeability is an essential
component in the finding of a force majeure event. That is not the
case under English law: 76 that the event “was or ought to be
foreseen . . . does not prevent it from becoming a frustrating event
when it occurs; the question . . . is whether the new situation thus
created is within or outside the scope of the contract on its true
construction.” 77 Further, unlike English law, the frustration of
common purpose is not by itself sufficient to discharge a contract.
It must also be unavoidable and insurmountable, which is a similar
standard to impossibility in the sense that both prevent discharge
based on performance becoming more onerous.78
2. Remedies
The consequence of force majeure is also different. Under
English law, the general remedy is discharge, and it is “all-ornothing,” meaning that either the whole contract is discharged or
none of it is.79 Under Chinese law, while discharge can similarly be
granted under Article 94(1), 80 Article 117 allows the court to
exempt the relevant party from liability in whole or in part, thus
providing much more flexibility in the award of remedy.81
3. Material Change Doctrine
However, the biggest difference between English and Chinese
laws lies in the doctrine of “material change” (Qíng shì biàn huà)82

75. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
76. See TREITEL, supra note 6, at 516-17.
77. Nile Co. for the Export of Agricultural Crops v. H. & J.M. Bennett (Commodities)
Ltd. [1963] QB 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 555, 582 (Eng.).
78. See TREITEL, supra note 6, at 284; Nicholas, supra note 72, at 24-25.
79. See Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, s. 1(2).
80. See CCL, art. 95.
81. See CCL, art. 117 (“[a] party who was unable to perform a contract due to force
majeure is exempted from liability in part or in whole in light of the impact of the event of
force majeure, except otherwise provided by law.”) (emphasis added).
82. Adopting the terminology used by the SPC in Huáiběi kuàngyè (jítuán) yǒuxiàn
zérèn gōngsī yǔ xīnguāng jítuán yǒuxiàn gong sī gǔquán zhuǎnràng jiūfēn èrshěn mínshì
pànjuéshū (淮北矿业（集团）有限责任公司与新光集团有限公 司股权转让纠纷二审民

2020]

FROM CORONATION TO CORONAVIRUS

201

under Article 26 of Interpretation II of the Supreme People’s Court
of Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Contract Law of
the People’s Republic of China (“Interpretation II”):83
“Where any major change which is unforeseeable, is not a
business risk and is not caused by a force majeure occurs after
the formation of a contract, if the continuous performance of
the contract is obviously unfair to the other party or cannot
realize the purposes of the contract and a party files a request
for the modification or rescission of the contract with the
people’s court, the people’s court shall decide whether to
modify or rescind the contract under the principle of fairness
and in light of the actualities of the case.”

This doctrine is by definition not force majeure, as it only
covers cases falling outside of force majeure. However, it could lead
to the same remedy, the discharge of the contract.84 For example,
in Chu Xiang v. Ni Keke Labor Contract Dispute,85 a case very similar
to Lakeman v. Pollard above, the defendant contracted to serve as
a translator for the plaintiff in Angola. However, due to the
outbreak of the Western African Ebola virus epidemic, the
defendant, worrying about her health, decided not to go to
Angola.86 The court recognized that the epidemic had introduced

事判决书) [Disputes in the equity transfer between Huaibei Mining (Group) Co., Ltd. and
Xinguang Group Co., Ltd.], Sup. People’s Ct. Gaz. 387 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2018) (China).
83. Zuìgāo rénmín fǎyuàn yìnfā “guānyú yīfǎ tuǒshàn shěnlǐ shè xīnguān fèiyán yìqíng
mínshì ànjiàn ruògān wèntí de zhǐdǎo yìjiàn (èr)” de tōngzhī (最高人民法院印发《关于依
法妥善审理涉新冠肺炎疫情民事案件若干问题的指导意见(二)》的通知) [Interpretation
of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning Application of the Contract
Law of the People's Republic of China (II) [2009]] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct.
Apr. 24, 2009, effective May 13, 2009). Note, however, that the concept of material change
has been used prior to Judicial Interpretation II. See, e.g., Shànghǎi èr zhōng yuàn shūlǐ
guānyú 2003 nián-2019 nián gèdì shè yìqíng hétóng jiūfēn 10 dà diǎnxíng ànlì zhī bā:
Huìzhōu mǒu gōngsī, lián mǒu yǔ guǎngxī mǒu gōngsī zūlìn hétóng jiūfēn àn (上海二中院
梳理关于 2003 年-2019 年各地涉疫情 合同纠纷 10 大典型案例之八：惠州某公司、连某
与广西某公司租赁合同纠纷案) [Huizhou Air China Auto. Trading Co., Ltd. and Guangxi
Airlines Co., Ltd. leasing contract dispute appeal], (Higher People’s Ct. of Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region 2007) (dealing with material change arising from SARS).
84. It is unclear whether discharge under material change still needs to have the
common purpose frustrated as in the case of discharge under Article 94(1).
85. Chǔ xiáng sù níkēkē láowù hétóng jiūfēn àn (储翔诉倪珂珂劳务合同纠纷案) [Chu
Xiang v. Ni Keke Labor Contract Dispute], (People’s Ct. of Xuanwu Dist., Nanjing City,
Jiangsu Province 2015) (China).
86. Id.
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material changes to the employment contract, and discharged the
parties from the contract accordingly.87
In this sense, the material change doctrine is very similar to
the American doctrine of impracticability.88 In fact, the SPC applied
the doctrine to a case that was very similar to Mineral Park. In
Chengdu Pengwei Industry Co., Ltd. v. People’s Government of
Yongxiu County of Jiangxi Province and Office of the Leading Group
for the Administration of Sand Mining of Poyang Lake of Yongxiu
County,89 the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant
for a mining right to sand at Poyang Lake. However, due to an
unprecedented low level of water in the lake during the term of the
contract, the plaintiff only managed to send its ships to mine sand
for a much shorter period of time than expected.90 The SPC held
that the low level of water was unforeseeable and thus applied the
material change doctrine.91 The court did not discuss why it was
not a force majeure case, but like Mineral Park it appears that the
mining was still possible despite the low level of water. 92 For
example, although the judgment did not suggest any alternatives,
it is possible that the plaintiff could use different types of sand
carrier or techniques.
Other than discharge of contract, remedies under the material
change doctrine include adaptation of contract. Interpretation II
allows an alternative remedy of adapting the contract based on the
“principle of fairness.” 93 This does not exist under the US

87. Id.
88. See Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard 156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916); supra notes 48-50
and accompanying text.
89 . Chéngdū péng wěi shíyè yǒuxiàn gōngsī yǔ jiāng xīshěng yǒngxiū xiàn rén
mínzhèngfǔ, yǒngxiū xiàn póyáng hú cǎi shā guǎnlǐ gōng zuò lǐngdǎo xiǎo zǔ bàngōngshì
cǎikuàng quán jiūfēn àn (成都鹏伟实业有限公司与江⻄省永修县⼈⺠政府、永修县鄱阳
湖采砂管理⼯作领导⼩组办公室采矿权纠纷案) [Chengdu Pengwei Indus. Co., Ltd. V
People’s Government of Yongxiu County of Jiangxi Province and Office of the Leading
Group for the Administration of Sand Mining of Poyang Lake of Yongxiu County], 2010 Sup.
People’s Ct. Gaz. 4 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2009) (China).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. In the judgment it was only stated that “the too low water level of Poyang Lake
made it hard for sand carriers to enter into the mining lots.” It has never been stated that
the mining was made impossible by the low water level.
93. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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impracticability doctrine. 94 It is further distinguished from the
remedy under Article 117 of CCL, which can only reduce liability of
the defendant. 95 It does not offer the possibility of upward
adaptation in favor of the plaintiff.96 In other words, the material
change doctrine can be used as both the shield and the sword.
Adaptation was the remedy awarded by the SPC in Chengdu
Pengwei when it ordered the defendant to return part of the
consideration paid for the mining right to the plaintiff.97
This adaptation remedy is not available under English law, but
has its equivalent under both French and German laws. 98 This
remedy has been emphatically rejected by English law, as there is
reluctance to bind parties ex post to a bargain on which they did
not agree. 99 On the other hand, as mentioned above, adaptation
could be achieved under English law by inserting appropriate
terms in the force majeure clause ex ante.100
4. Force Majeure Clause
Chinese courts apply a stricter interpretation on force majeure
clauses. On paper, Article 93 of the CCL allows parties to change the
default force majeure events by making them easier or more
difficult to satisfy.101 However, a series of SPC cases shows that the
Chinese courts interpreted such clauses rather narrowly. For
example, in Chengdu Pengwei, the contract provided specifically
that “production impossibility and all other risks for water level
and other objective reasons shall be assumed by [the mining
company].” 102 Yet, the SPC did not address this clause at all in
reaching its decision. Alternatively, it could be interpreted that the
94. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 57, at 647 (although a similar idea of equitable
adjustment that gives a court the power to “grant relief on such terms as justice requires”
has been suggested by the Restatement Second of Contracts § 272, it is not generally
adopted by the US courts).
95. See CCL, art. 117.
96. Id.
97. 2010 Sup. People’s Ct. Gaz. 4
98. TRIETEL, supra note 6, at 578-79.
99. Id. at 580-81.
100. Id. at 449.
101. See CCL, art. 93 (“[t]he parties may prescribe a condition under which one party
is entitled to terminate the contract. Upon satisfaction of the condition for termination of
the contract, the party with the termination right may terminate the contract.”).
102. See 2010 Sup. People’s Ct. Gaz. 4.
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SPC simply found the clause unfair to the plaintiff in the context of
the material change principle.
Moreover, drafters of contracts have also tried to expand on
the default force majeure events, though without much success. In
Beijing Zehua Chemical Engineering Co., Ltd. v. Chongqing Jianfeng
Industrial Group Co., Ltd., 103 one of the specified force majeure
events was “government action or Act of State.” However, the SPC
thought that the said term should be interpreted in light of the
default definition of force majeure to avoid uncertainty. 104
Accordingly, since the government action in question was
foreseeable, there was no force majeure event.105
Finally, clauses that seek to narrow the scope of the default
force majeure events have also failed. In Disputes of House Rental
Contract Disputes of Hongshan Village Committee of Hongshan
Street Office of Hongshan People’s Government of Hubei Shuidiao
Getou Food Culture Development Co., 106 although the clause in
question only listed “flooding, earthquake or war” as force majeure
events, the SPC held that an event other than the listed ones could
still be regarded as a force majeure event so long as it fell within
the statutory definition.107 In short, while courts in both England
and China want to reduce uncertainty, their approaches are
opposite to each other. The negative view of force majeure clauses
under China’s law contrasts greatly with English law’s positive
view for reducing uncertainty. The SPC probably considers the
force majeure clauses unnecessary considering the vast power
103. Běijīng zé huá huàxué gōngchéng yǒuxiàn gōngsī, chóngqìng jiàn fēng gōngyè
jítuán yǒu xiàn gōngsī jìshù zhuǎnràng hétóng jiūfēn zàishěn mínshì pànjuéshū (北京泽华
化学工程有限公司、重庆建峰工业集团有限公司技术转让合同纠纷再审民事判决书)
[Beijing Zehua Chem.l Eng’g Co., Ltd. v. Chongqing Jianfeng Indus. Grp. Co., Ltd], Sup.
People’s Ct. Gaz. 271 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2018) (China).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106 . Húběi shuǐ diào gē tóu yǐnshí wénhuà fāzhǎn yǒuxiàn gōngsī, wǔhàn shì
hóngshān qū rénmín zhèngfǔ hóngshān jiē bànshì chù hóng shāncūn cūnmín wěiyuánhuì
fángwū zū liánbāng hétóng jiūfēn èrshěn mínshì pànjuéshū (湖北水调歌头饮食文化发展
有限公 武汉市洪山 区人民政府洪山街办事处洪山村村民委员会房屋租 联邦合同纠纷二
审 民 事 判 决 书 ) [Disputes of House Rental Contract Disputes of Hongshan Village
Committee of Hongshan Street Office of Hongshan People’s Government of Hubei Shuidiao
Getou Food Culture Development Co], Sup. People’s Ct. Gaz. 107 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2018)
(China).
107. Id.
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afforded under Article 117 and the material change doctrine that
can be used to discharge or adapt the contract. A similar approach
is also found in French law in regard to force majeure clauses.108
5. COVID-19-Specific Law
China has recently made COVID-19 specific laws to cover force
majeure in the form of the three Guidances. 109 The Guidances
mainly provide more detailed applications of the existing laws to
force majeure cases caused by COVID-19. For example, Article 2 of
Guidance I refers to the relevant articles in the GPCL and the CCL
as the applicable legislations on force majeure arising from COVID19. 110 Article III(2) of Guidance I and Article I(2) of Guidance II
both provide for the court’s power of adaptation based on the
principle of fairness regarding certain specified situations. 111
Despite the absence of any reference to Article 26 of Interpretation
II, it is clear that the aforementioned articles in Guidances I and II
are derived from the material change doctrine.112 However, what
stands out from the Guidances in terms of force majeure is the lack
of any reference given to force majeure clauses agreed upon
108. See Nicholas supra note 72, at 29.
109. See Guidance I, Guidance II and Guidance III.
110. See Guidance I, Art. II.
111. See Guidance I, Art. III(2)(“[i]f continuing performing the contract makes it
obviously unfair to one party, and the party requests to change the performance period,
performance method or price of the contract, the people's court shall, based on actual
conditions of the case, decide whether to support such a request”); Guidance II, Art I(2)
(“The negatively affected party’s request to adjust the price shall be supported by the
peoples courts in accordance with the principle of fairness and the actual situation of each
case, where the sales contract can be performed continuously but a significant increase in
the costs of labor, raw materials, logistics and other performance or a significant price
reduction results from the epidemic or the epidemic prevention and control measures and
the continuance of the performance of the contract would be obviously unfair to one party.
A party’s request to change the performance period shall be supported by the peoples
courts based on the principle of fairness and actual situation of each case, where the sellers
failure to deliver the goods within the agreed time limit or the buyers failure to pay within
the agreed time limit results from the epidemic or epidemic prevention and control
measures.”).
112. See Binbin Sun & Zhuo Xu, Annotation of Guidance on the Proper Handling of Civil
Cases Involving the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak in Accordance with the Law (I), ZHONGLUN
VISION
(Apr.
21,
2020),
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MjM5ODI5MzI0NA==&mid=2651315116&idx=2&sn
=7d2cfd68c8d4eff83362a04806e5f261&scene=21#wechat_redirect
[https://perma.cc/JT62-BSZD].
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between the parties. For example, Article I(1) of Guidance II
provides that if a seller cannot deliver goods as agreed due to
COVID-19 or related measures and frustrates the buyer’s purpose,
the buyer is entitled to seek discharge of the contract. 113 However,
he can only recover the deposit and may not sue the seller for
breach of liability. 114 This rule seems to be in line with Articles
94(1) and 95 of the CCL. However, what if the contract provides for
a 90-day suspension for force majeure or the recovery of
reasonable expenditure in the case of discharge? Will these clauses
now be overridden by Article 1(1)? The lack of consideration
regarding force majeure clauses is in line with the SPC’s tendency
to restrict or ignore the force majeure clauses discussed above.
There is no equivalent new legislation under English law.
6. Force Majeure Certificate
Finally, the China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade (the “CCPIT”) has recently issued a large number of force
majeure certificates to contracting parties to certify disruptions
caused by COVID-19.115 Some countries, such as Russia and Italy,
also have these force majeure certificate systems. 116 The legal
status of the CCPIT certificates is, however, uncertain under
113. See Guidance II, Art. I(1)(“The buyer’s request to terminate the contract and
return advance payment or deposit shall be supported by the peoples courts, if the seller
fails to complete the order or deliver the goods within the agreed time limit due to the
epidemic or the epidemic prevention and control measures, and the purpose of the buyer
cannot be realized by continuance of the performance; while the buyer request that the
seller shall be liable for breach of contract, such request shall not be supported by the
peoples courts.”).
114. Id.
115 . See Press Release, China Council for the Promotion of Int’l Trade, CCPIT
Provides COVID-19 Force majeure Certificates and Other Services (Feb. 16, 2020),
http://www.ccpit.org/Contents/Channel_4324/2020/0216/1240959/content_1240959.
htm [https://perma.cc/N6XJ-TKBY] (having issued more than 4,800 such certificates as of
March 13, 2020).
116 . See Ekaterina Pannebaker, Force Majeure Certificates Issued by the Russian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://conflictoflaws.net/2020/force-majeure-certificates-by-the-russian-chamber-ofcommerce-and-industry/ [https://perma.cc/H5R2-729S]; see also Guilio Maroncelli &
Roberta Padula, COVID-19 emergency - Force majeure certificates issued by the Chambers of
Commerce
in
Italy,
DLA
PIPER
(Apr.
8,
2020),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/hongkong/insights/publications/2020/04/covid-19emergency---force-majeure-certificates-issued-by-the-chambers-of-commerce-in-italy/
[https://perma.cc./68J7-VRS4].
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Chinese law. Unlike Russia and Italy, which both have their
respective Chamber of Commerce to issue the certificate, 117 the
CCPIT is officially composed of civilians, although its Articles of
Association was said to have been approved by the State Council.118
These Articles also authorized CCPIT to issue such force majeure
certificates. 119 In Sichuan Borui Vision Outdoor Media Co., Ltd. v.
Hangzhou Aoxiang Advertising Co., Ltd., a case decided in 2016, the
contract in question expressly required the party claiming force
majeure to submit evidence to CCPIT within 15 days of the
occurrence of the alleged event.120 Since no evidence was provided
to CCPIT, the court held that the force majeure defense failed.121
While the case does not discuss the standalone status of the CCPIT
certificate without the force majeure clause, it does show that the
CCPIT was handling force majeure matters prior to the COVID-19
outbreak, and its force majeure certificate could command certain
respect from the Chinese courts. This suggests that a CCPIT
certificate may have certain evidentiary value under Chinese law.
In summary, Chinese force majeure law is substantially
different from its English counterpart. It is defined particularly by
the restrictive interpretation of the force majeure clause and the
vast power of the Chinese courts to adapt the contract. The
Guidances further widen these differences. As these differences
may be outcome determinative, they make private international
law analysis even more important to COVID-19-related force
majeure cases.
III. COMPARISON OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
One of the earliest private international law cases involving
force majeure is Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Crédit Lyonnais. 122
Decided in 1884, the case presented the English Court of Appeal
117. See, e.g., Pannebaker, supra note 116.
118. See China Council for the Promotion of Int’l Trade, CCPIT Charter (2015).
119. Id., Art 8(1).
120. Sìchuān bó ruì yǎnjiè hùwài zhuàn méi yǒuxiàn gōngsī sù hángzhōu ào xiáng
guǎnggào yǒu xiàn gōngsī děng gǔquán zhuǎnràng jiūfēn àn (四川博瑞眼界户外传媒有限
公司诉杭州奥翔广告有 限公司等股权转让纠纷案) [Sichuan Borui Vision Outdoor Media
Co., Ltd. V. Hangzhou Aoxiang Advert. Co., Ltd.], (Chengdu Intermediate People’s Ct.,
Sichuan Province 2017) (China).
121. Id.
122. Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Crédit Lyonnais [1884] QB 12 589 (Eng.).
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with two competing laws, namely force majeure under the French
Civil Code, which would discharge the contract, and the English law
of frustration, under which there would be no discharge. 123 The
court stated at the outset that the threshold matter was “whether
this contract is to be construed according to English law or
according to French.” 124 Applying the English choice of law
contract rule, which assumed the law of the place of execution to
be the proper law of contract, the court held that the law of
England, where the contract was entered into, was to apply. 125
However, if an English court is to consider the case again under the
current choice of law rules of the Rome I Regulation of the
European Union,126 it is possible that the French Civil Code, the law
of the country where the seller had its habitual residence, could be
regarded the law of the place with the closest connections.127 In
that case, French law would apply and force majeure would
discharge the contract accordingly. This case thus shows the
importance of the private international law rule to an international
force majeure dispute.
The court also discussed whether the French Civil Code could
still be applied even though the contract was governed by English
law. While acknowledging that the French Civil Code could be
incorporated into the contract, the court was of the opinion that it
should be incorporated by an express term. 128 This once again
marginalizes the role of the law of the place of performance and
makes the choice of law issue regarding frustration a simple
process of identifying the proper law of contract.
In Rule 150 of Dicey’s A Digest of the Law of England with
reference to the Conflict of Laws (the first edition of Dicey & Morris
which was published in 1896), Dicey states that “[t]he validity of
the discharge of a contract . . . depends upon the proper law of the

123. Id.
124. Id. at 599.
125. Id. at 602-03.
126. Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EU) [hereinafter Rome I
Regulation].
127. See id. at Art. 4(1)(a); see also infra note 140 and accompanying text.
128. See Jacobs, QB 12 at 604.
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contract.” 129 This certainly matches with the approach of Jacobs,
though Professor Dicey did not cite the case in Rule 150. Jacobs was
eventually cited in the relevant rule in the sixth edition of Dicey &
Morris (Rule 143) when Professor Otto Kahn-Freund rewrote the
chapter on contract. 130 It was cited to support the position that
“[t]he proper law ought to determine . . . whether [performance] is
excused as a result, e.g., of the frustration of the contract.”131 Citing
Jacobs, Kahn-Freund further stated that in the comment of SubRule 3 of Rule 136, while the “method and manner” of the
performance should be regulated by the law of the place of
performance, frustration, as a matter of “substance of obligation,”
is governed by the proper law of the contract.132 Although Rule 143
was edited out of the book since the twelfth edition when the
editors rewrote the chapter to accommodate the change in the
choice of law regime resulting from the Rome Convention, the
comment in Rule 136 remains in the latest edition.133 The simple
and authoritative treatment of frustration as a matter covered by
the governing law since such an early stage of the development of
English conflict of laws partly explains why frustration has not
attracted much discussion in the context of private international
law by courts and commentators in common law jurisdictions.
The position remains the same under the Rome I Regulation
as stated in a recent case, Canary Wharf (BP4) T1 Ltd. v. European
Medicines Agency.134 The court held that frustration was governed
by the proper law of contract under Article 12 of the Rome I
Regulation, whether by virtue of Article 12(1)(b) regarding
performance of contract, or Article 12(1)(d) regarding
extinguishing contract.135 It does not matter in the end, as the same
law will apply.136
129. ALBERT VENN DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS: WITH NOTES OF AMERICAN CASES 575 (1896); see also GEOFFREY C. CHESHIRE,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 337 (3rd ed. 1935) (suggesting the same position).
130. DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 651-652 (J.H.C. Morris et al.
eds., 6th ed. 1949).
131. Id. at 652.
132. Id. at 601.
133. See DICEY, MORRIS & COLINS, supra note 18, at ¶ 32-162.
134. Canary Wharf (BP4) T1 Ltd. V. European Medicines Agency [2019] EWHC (Ch)
335 (Eng.).
135. Id. at ¶186.
136. Id.
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To identify the proper law of contract under Rome I
Regulation, Article 3 provides that parties may choose the
substantive law. 137 This is most commonly done by an express
choice of law clause in international commercial transactions, as in
Canary Wharf itself where the parties included a choice of law
clause in favor of English law.138 As a result, the English rules of
frustration applied to the force majeure issue in the case.139 In the
absence of choice, the Rome I Regulation applies the law with the
closest connections to the contract.140 Article 4 identifies such law
by using the presumption of characteristic performance subject to
rebuttal by the law of a country that is manifestly more closely
connected with the contract.141
At first glance, the Chinese choice of law regime is very
similar. Under Articles 3 and 41 of the Law of Choice of Law for
Foreign-related Civil Relationships (the “Choice of law Act”),
contracting parties may choose the law applicable to their
contract. 142 This law applies to all issues arising from contract,
including force majeure. For example, in Appeal Case for Ship
Leasing Contract Disputes between J.PI Travel U.S.A., Inc. and
Yangtze River Shipping Overseas Tourism Corporation,143 the Hubei
High Court held that the force majeure that resulted from SARS
should be governed by Chinese law, which was designated as the
applicable law under the express choice of law clause in the
contract.144 Like Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation, in the absence
of choice, the law most closely connected with the contract will be
applied, and is once again guided by characteristic performance.145
137. Rome I Regulation, art. 3.
138. [2019] EWHC (Ch) 335, at ¶ 179.
139. Id.
140. Rome I Regulation, art. 4.
141. Id.
142. Decree of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by HU Jintao, President
of China, Oct. 28, 2010), NO. 36, arts. 3, 41 (China) [hereinafter Choice of Law Act].
143. Měiguó dōngjiāng lǚyóu jítuán gōngsī (J) yǔ chángjiāng lúnchuán hǎiwài lǚyóu
zǒng gōngsī chuánbó zūlìn hétóng jiūfēn shàngsù àn (美国东江旅游集团公司（J）与长江
轮船海外旅游总公司船舶租赁合同纠纷上诉案) [Appeal Case for Ship Leasing Contract
Disputes between J.PI Travel U.S.A., Inc. and Yangtze River Shipping Overseas Tourism
Corporation], (Higher People’s Ct. of Hubei Province 2007) (China).
144. The case predated the Choice of Law Act, but the choice of law principle is
substantially the same.
145. Choice of Law Act, Art. 41.
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Force majeure is also clearly characterized as a matter for the
applicable law of contract under Chinese law, with no article in the
Choice of Law Act giving any role to the law of the place of
performance.
Due to the similarities between the choice of law rules of the
two countries, it appears that the same substantive law will apply
regardless of the forum. If this is indeed the case, even if the
substantive laws on COVID-19-related force majeure are different,
choice of law rules will theoretically not be outcome
determinative. 146 However, the reality of the interactions of the
two regimes are much more complicated. This is because of the
differences in mandatory rule, illegality, procedural laws, judicial
practice on choice of law, and jurisdiction and enforcement of
judgments.
A. Mandatory Rule and Public Policy
The public and national interests discussed above will prima
facie be reflected in private international law in the form of
mandatory rules and public policy. The public interest in COVID19 demands analysis in this aspect even if it is not generally
necessary for a standard force majeure case.
Article 4 of the Choice of Law Act provides that Chinese
mandatory law will apply regardless of the applicable foreign
law.147 Particularly, law on public health is among one of the five
specific categories of laws identified as being mandatory under the
SPC interpretation.148 Although most of the decided cases applying

146. TREVOR C. HARTLEY, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 4 (3rd ed. 2020).
147. Choice of Law Act, art. 4.
148 . See Zuìgāo rénmín fǎyuàn guānyú shìyòng “zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó
shèwài mínshì guānxì fǎlǜ shìyòng fǎ” ruògān wèntí de jiěshì (yī) (最高人民法院关于适用
《中华人民共和国涉外民事关系法律适用法》若干问题的解释(一)) [Interpretations of
the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning Application of the Law of the
People’s Republic of China on Choice of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relationships (I)]
(promulgated by the Judicial Comm. of the Supreme People’s Ct., Dec. 10, 2012, effective
Jan. 7, 2013), art. 10(2) [hereinafter Choice of Law Interpretation I].
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Article 4 involved employment 149 or financial legislations, 150 the
Guidances clearly fall within the said category. In addition, the
preamble of Guidance II prominently highlights the significance of
the socioeconomic impacts of COVID-19 by referring to its purpose
as furthering “Liu Wen” and “Liu Bao,” which are both economic
goals of China.151 It is thus arguable that the Guidances may apply
as mandatory law even if the applicable law identified by Article 41
is a foreign law.152
Another way to achieve the same result is to utilize the public
policy exception under Article 5. This article applies Chinese law if
the applicable foreign law is prejudicial to the social and public
interests of China.153 If the application of the English force majeure
rule is found to be contrary to China’s public interest, the
Guidances will thus apply instead.154 There is, however, no room
under the Choice of Law Act for the mandatory rule of foreign law
to apply if it is not the applicable law. This is because the wording
of Article 5 only operates negatively, i.e. negating the effect of
foreign law contrary to Chinese mandatory law, but not positively,
i.e. negating the effect of Chinese law contrary to foreign
mandatory law.155
English law also provides for the application of English
overriding mandatory law and non-application of foreign law that
149. See, e.g., Yú zhìliáng yǔ wēi mào jīngmì wǔjīn (zhūhǎi) yǒuxiàn gōngsī láodòng
zhēngyì shàngsù àn (余志良与威茂精密五金（珠海）有限公司劳动争议上诉案) [Yu
Zhiliang v. Weimao Precision Hardware (Zhuhai) Co., Ltd.], (2017).
150. See, e.g., Gāodélóng děng sù nánjīng jīn shà shíyè yǒuxiàn gōngsī gōngsī jièkuǎn
hétóng jiūfēn àn (高德龙等诉南京金厦实业有限公司公司借款合同纠纷案) [Gao Delong et
al. v. Nanjing Jinsha Industrial Co., Ltd.], (2014).
151. For details of “Liu Wen” (stability on the six fronts) and “Liu Bao” (stability on
the six areas), See Zhang Jianfeng, Chinese premier stresses stabilizing foreign trade,
investment,
CCTV
(June
29,
2020),
https://english.cctv.com/2020/06/29/ARTI3drmj1p5gwPe0NwOAAU8200629.shtml
[https://perma.cc/RRR7-E34L].
152. In this context, it will fall into the catch-all category under Article 10(6) of
Choice of law Interpretation I.
153. Most decided cases on Article 5 relate to gambling debt. See, e.g., Luōjīng yǔ
gǔlìmíng, hánxùyīng mínjiān jièdài jiūfēn yīshěn mínshì pànjuéshū (罗京与谷力鸣、韩旭
英民间借贷纠纷一审民事判决书) [Luo Jing, Gu Liming v. Han Xuying] (2019).
154. See Choice of Law Act, art. 5 (“[i]f the application of foreign laws will damage the
social public interests of the People's Republic of China, the laws of the People's Republic
of China shall apply.”).
155. Id.
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is contrary to English public policy under Articles 9(2) and 21,
respectively.156 In addition, such application is also possible under
Article 3(3), which provides that where all other elements points
to a country other than the country whose law has been chosen,
the chosen law may not prejudice the application non-derogable
law, namely the provisions of the law of that other country which
cannot be derogated from by agreement.157 An act that provides
for remedies in frustration cases like the Law Reform (Frustrated
Contracts) Act 1943 might thus potentially apply under these
Articles even if Chinese law is the applicable law. Another potential
application might be the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, which
may apply as mandatory law to strike out an unfair force majeure
clause.
Unlike Chinese law, however, it is possible for a foreign
overriding mandatory rule to apply positively even if it is not the
law the parties chose to the extent that the rule is a non-derogable
law under Article 3(3). For example, in Banco Santander Totta SA
v. Companhia de Carris de Ferro de Lisboa SA,158 the English Court
of Appeal held in obiter that Article 437 of the Portuguese Civil
Code, which is a force majeure provision of Portuguese law, would
have been applied under Article 3(3) if all the relevant factors had
pointed to Portugal.159 Although Lord Justice Longmore cautioned
that “there is something to be said for the view that a force majeure
provision of a national law (such as Article 437) is not necessarily
a provision which is non-derogable within the terms of Article
3(3),”160 a force majeure law specially passed for the purpose of
COVID-19, such as the new SPC judicial interpretations, would
seem to present a strong case as non-derogable law when all the
factors point to China.
In short, by comparing the choice of law rules between the
two countries, it is theoretically possible for each jurisdiction to
apply the forum’s own mandatory rule even if the other’s law is the
applicable law. However, in case of the forum law being the
156. Rome I Regulation, arts. 9(2), 21.
157. Rome I Regulation, art. 3(3).
158. Banco Santander Totta SA v. Companhia de Carris de Ferro de Lisboa SA [2017]
EWCA (Civ) 1267, 1 WLR 1323 (Eng.).
159. Id. at 839.
160. Id. at 855.
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applicable law, only England will consider applying the Chinese
mandatory rule.
Fortunately, each of the relevant substantive laws relating to
force majeure has a provision that eliminates these complicated
applications in both countries. Article 6(1) of Guidance III
expressly provides that the governing law on force majeure issues
shall be identified by the rules under the Choice of Law Act.161 This
clearly indicates that the rules under the Guidances are not
mandatory rules. In addition, Article 6(3) of Guidance III also
reminds Chinese judges not to assume that the foreign rules on
force majeure are the same as their Chinese counterparts, thus
clearly foreseeing the possibility of applying foreign force majeure
rules.162
The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 is even
more straightforward. Section 1(1) of the Act expressly provides
that it only applies to English contracts.163 While Morris thought
the section was redundant, 164 it does eliminate any potential
uncertainty on the Act’s application as a mandatory rule. For the
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, its role as an overriding
mandatory rule refers only to its overriding effects on parties’
freedom to choose the applicable law in applicable cases, 165
instead of its provision applying directly to international contract.
Commentators have generally agreed that force majeure clauses
are not normally subject to the Act in any event.166 This is because
“a party whose performance is prevented or delayed by
supervening events [specified in the force majeure clause] is not in
breach at all.”167 As such, a force majeure clause, by defining the
party’s duty, is distinguished from an exemption clause which

161. Choice of Law Act, art. 6(3).
162. Id.
163. The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, Ch. 40 s 1(1)
(Eng.).
164. J. H. C. Morris, The Choice of Law Clause in Statutes, 62 L. Q. REV. 170, 183 (1946)
(“the words limiting the scope of the Frustrated Contracts Act to ‘contracts governed by
English law’ are unnecessary and inadequate.”).
165. See Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, c.50, § 27(2) (Eng.); see also discussions in
CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 23, at 579-81.
166. See, e.g., TREITEL, supra note 6, at 469-71.
167. Id. at 469-70.
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excludes or limits liability. 168 Only the latter is regulated by the
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.
For public policy to reject foreign law, Article 21 of the Rome
I Regulation has also raised the standard higher than its
predecessor to “manifestly incompatible,”169 thus making it more
difficult to apply. While the Chinese rules are substantially
different from the English rules, there does not seem to be anything
particularly objectionable to merit rejection by English public
policy.
It is also highly unlikely for an English court to apply a Chinese
mandatory rule through Article 3(3). If Guidance III allows the
potential application of foreign force majeure law, the Guidances
are not going to be regarded as non-derogable law either. In any
event, it would be highly unlikely for Article 3(3) of Rome I
Regulation to have a chance to apply in the first place. This is
because the Article would only apply when all factors of the case
point to a foreign country, except the express choice by the parties.
Such a case will hardly exist when it comes to Chinese contracts
since the Choice of Law Act only allow parties to choose a foreign
law if the contract is foreign-related.170
In short, even if the public interest in COVID-19 requires an
analysis of public policy-related rules of private international law,
as far as Sino-British force majeure laws are concerned, it is highly
unlikely that they would be applied for public policy reasons.
B. Illegality
The public interest in preventing the spread of COVID-19 has
led countries to make laws on quarantine and lockdowns. In China,
for example, the Wuhan government promulgated the Interim
Measures for the Prevention and Control of Pneumonia Outbreak
of Novel Coronavirus Infection in Wuhan (the “Interim Measures”),
which provides the Wuhan government the powers to, inter alia,
declare quarantine orders and suspend work as appropriate. 171
168. Id. at 470.
169. Rome I Regulation, art. 21.
170. See Choice of Law Act, Art. 2 and Choice of Law Interpretation I, art. 1.
171 . Wǔhàn shì xīnxíng guānzhuàng bìngdú gǎnrǎn de fèiyán yìqíng fáng kòng
zhànxíng bànfǎ (武汉市新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情防控暂行办法) [Interim Measures
for the Prevention and Control of Pneumonia Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus Infection in
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The breach of these laws could potentially be a standalone force
majeure event to a contract, in addition to the existence of the
underlying pandemic. For example, suppose an international
supply contract provides for the manufacturing of certain goods in
a Wuhan plant of a Chinese supplier during a particular period, the
subsequent imposition of the quarantine law could make the
operations of the plant in that period illegal.172 In English private
international law, this raises the issue of illegality.173
In Ralli Bros v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar, the English
court established the rule that a supervening illegality in the law of
the place of performance makes a contract unenforceable even if
the law is not the governing law of the contract.174 There have been
heated debates on whether the rule is a part of English domestic
contract law or private international law.175 If it is the former, the
rule will only apply if English law is the governing law of the
contract (as in the facts of Ralli Bros), but will not apply when the
governing law is that of a third country.176 The “prevailing view” is
that it is an English domestic contract law doctrine.177
However, if the rule ever had any private international law
effect, it is now preserved in Article 9(3) of Rome I Regulation. The
article provides that effect may be given to the overriding
mandatory provisions of the law of the country where the
obligations arising out of the contract must be performed or have
been performed, where such provisions render the performance
unlawful.178 Thus, the English court has discretion to permit the
application of an overriding mandatory Chinese provision, even if
it is neither part of English law (the lex fori) nor the governing law,
Wuhan] (promulgated by Wuhan Headquarters for the Prevention and Control of
Pneumonia Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus Infection, effective Jan. 29, 2020), arts. 27, 29.
172. See id. at art. 43 (providing that the violation of any provision of the Interim
Measures would be subject to legal liability, though the article is rather vague as to the
exact consequence).
173. For a general discussion on illegality, see DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 18,
at ch. 32.
174. Ralli Bros v Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 K.B. 287 (Eng.).
175 . See William Day, Contracts, Illegality and Comity: Ralli Bros Revisited, 79
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 64, 67-70 (2020).
176. See DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 18, at ¶ 32-097.
177. Id. at ¶ 32-100. Cf. Day, supra note 175, at 80-87 (arguing that the rule is neither
a choice of law rule nor part of English contract law, but a public policy rule).
178. See DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 18, at ¶ 32-096.

2020]

FROM CORONATION TO CORONAVIRUS

217

so long as China is the place of performance. On the other hand, if
the governing law is English law, the Ralli Bros rule would still
apply. 179 The effect in that case is similar to that of Article 9(3)
except that the English court will not have the aforementioned
discretion, and must thus make the contract unenforceable.180
For the purposes of COVID-19 cases, the doctrine of illegality
will have three impacts. First, even if Chinese law is not the
governing law, its quarantine law could still render the contract
unenforceable if it makes the contract illegal. Second, the
consequence of the application of illegality is different from
frustration under English law. If there is a supervening illegality,
the contract is unenforceable, though it is not discharged under
frustration. 181 The case of Ralli Bros illustrates this distinction.
Although the contract’s consideration exceeded the maximum
price of jute allowed under the supervening Spanish law (the law
of the place of performance) the English court simply held that the
defendant was not liable to pay more than maximum allowable
price. 182 It did not discharge the contract. 183 Finally, unlike the
public policy analysis above, the threshold for illegality is lower. All
it requires is that the contract is illegal under the law of the place
of performance, without requiring the court to conduct a difficult
weighing of the public policy at stake.
No similar rule is found under Chinese choice of law rules.
Illegality under English law will only be taken into account if
English law is the governing law of contract. Article 4 applies solely
to the mandatory rules of China and Article 5 applies only
negatively to reject foreign law.184
C. Procedural Law
Professor Trevor Hartley argues that the harmonization of the
choice of law rules will not eliminate the importance of
179. See id. at ¶ 32-097.
180. See id. ¶ 32-102.
181. See Day, supra note 175, at 84.
182. Ralli Bros v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 K.B. 287 (Eng.).
183. See Day, supra note 175, at 84.
184. The effect of Article 5 is similar to Article 21 of Rome I Regulation. For further
details on the negative concept of public policy under Article 21, see CHESHIRE, NORTH &
FAWCETT, supra note 23, at 752-54; see also Choice of Law Act, Arts. 4, 5.
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jurisdictional analysis (and thus forum shopping) due to the
difference in procedural rules.185 In fact, he thinks that “procedure
is often more important than substantive law in determining the
outcome of litigation.” 186 Under Article 12 of Rome I Regulation,
procedural issues are governed by the national law of the member
states. 187 For England, this means that most of these procedural
matters will be governed by the lex fori under the common law.188
The position is less clear under Chinese law, as there is no specific
rule under the Choice of Law Act. 189 One commentator has
recommended to have lex fori governing procedural matters like
most other countries. 190 Thus, both countries will apply their
respective procedural laws regardless of the applicable
substantive law. The applicable foreign remedy which does not
exist under the forum’s procedural law is relevant to this
discussion, particularly in the context of English procedural law.
Since force majeure’s primary function is to allocate losses
fairly between the parties, 191 whether a court is able to offer a
particular remedy, i.e. the desired loss application, under foreign
force majeure law is a significant concern to the parties. If the
remedy is discharge of contract, there will be no issue, as both
England and China can give that remedy under their own
procedural law.192 However, as mentioned above, a key difference
between the two countries on substantive law is the adaptation
power under the material change doctrine in Chinese law.193 This
could cause a substantial issue if an English court applies that
principle, since adaptation is not part of English domestic law. The
general rule under English law is that the court may not grant a

185. See HARTLEY, supra note 146, at 5-6.
186. Id. at 6.
187. Rome I Regulation, Art. 12.
188. See RICHARD GARNETT, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
38 (1st ed. 2012).
189. See, e.g., Guangjian Tu, Private International Law in China 571 (2016).
190. Id. at 44.
191. See TREITEL, supra note 6.
192. See Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) Rev. Rep. 3 B. & S. 826, 840 (Eng.); see also Law
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, s. 1(2). For the position of Chinese law, see CCL,
art. 95.
193. See supra notes 84-100 and accompanying text.
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remedy unknown to the lex fori.194 As far as the adaptation power
is concerned, there are three possibilities:
(i) To reject both the right and remedy. This is pursuant to
Phrantzes v. Argenti where the English court refused to compel
the plaintiff’s father to enter into a dowry contract on the
plaintiff’s behalf under Greek law as the remedy was not
available under English procedural law.195 In addition, since
the remedy is part and parcel of the right, the court decided to
dismiss the entire case.196 By analogy, it has been commented
that the vast power of contract variation under the Australian
Trade Practices Act 1974 (currently Competition and
Consumer Act 2010)197 would be “perhaps too difficult” to be
applied by the English courts.198
(ii) To grant both the right and remedy. Conversely, it is
possible that the remedy of the adaptation could be made in
the right case by analogy to domestic remedies under English
law. For example, this could be achieved by quantum meruit
where work has been performed by a party after the contract
is discharged by frustration.199 If that approach succeeds, the
court would of course also recognize the right. However, it is
also clear that such a remedy is still substantially different
from the adaptation power.
(iii) To grant the right but to apply a domestic remedy. This is
the approach taken by the Canadian case, Khalij Commercial
Bank Ltd v. Woods.200 The Ontario Court recognized the debt
194. ADRIAN BRIGGS, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS, 149-50 (1st ed.
2014).
195. Phrantzes v. Argenti [1960] 2 QB 19 (Eng.).
196. Id. For a similar rule in the US, see Conflict of Laws: Application of Foreign
Remedies, 1961, DUKE L. J. 316-22 (1961).
197. See Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 87 (2)(b) (Austl.) (allowing the court to
make “an order varying such a contract or arrangement in such manner as is specified in
the order and, if the Court thinks fit, declaring the contract or arrangement to have had
effect as so varied on and after such date before the date on which the order is made as is
so specified”).
198. See Adrian Briggs, Conflict of Laws and Commercial Remedies, in COMMERCIAL
REMEDIES CURRENT ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 271, 275 (Andrew Burrows & Edwin Peel eds.,
2003); see also GARNETT, supra note 188, at 296.
199. See Société Tunisienne d’Armement v. Sidermar SpA [1960] 2 QB 278 (Eng.); see
also TREITEL, supra note 6 at 581-82. For an American example, see Lakeman v. Pollard 43
Me. 463, 467 (1857) (“[i]f [the plaintiff] was prevented by sickness or similar inability he
may recover for what he did, on a quantum meruit.”).
200. Khalij Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Woods (1985) 17 O.R. 358 (Can. Ont.).
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governed by Saudi law but applied the forum’s enforcement
rule in place of the Saudi enforcement law which gave much
more discretion to the court than Canadian law did. The court
distinguished it from Phrantzes v Argenti, by stating that inter
alia the remedy in that case was not a fixed sum of money and
that the enforcement powers in practice were not expected to
be much different.201

With respect to the adaptation power of the material change
doctrine, it appears that possibility (iii) is the most likely.
Adaptation power is not the only remedy under the material
change doctrine. Discharge is still available.202 Thus, it is unlikely
that the court would see the remedy of adaptation as integral to the
contractual right (which is similar to frustration though technically
different). This is further supported by Banco Santander Totta
discussed above. 203 Article 437 of the Portuguese Civil Code is a
very similar provision to Article 26 of Interpretation II. 204 Both
articles provide for adaptation if there is substantial change in case
of material changes.205 Although the court did not apply Article 437
in the end, the fact that it thought it could be applied206 suggests
that the court saw no difficulty in doing so. Further, the claimant
also sought termination or modification of contract.207 In this light,
the situation is much closer to Khalij Commercial Bank than
Phrantzes, and the English court may simply discharge the contract
when it applies Article 26 of Interpretation II.
Another procedural law issue is the force majeure certificate
which concerns proof of foreign law. Part II of this Article
201. Id.
202. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
203. Banco Santander Totta SA v. Companhia de Carris de Ferro de Lisboa SA [2017]
1 WLR 1323 (Eng.).
204 . See id. at 1323, 1329 (“Abnormal change in circumstances 1. If the
circumstances on which the parties based their decision to enter into a contract have
undergone an abnormal change, the injured party is entitled to termination of the contract
or to modify it in accordance with principles of equity if fulfilment of that party’s
obligations under the contract would be a serious breach of the principles of good faith
and if the abnormal changes do not form part of the risks covered by the contract. 2. If
termination is requested, the counterparty may oppose by stating that it accepts
modification of the contract in accordance with the previous paragraph.”).
205. See Código Civil, art. 437 and Interpretation II, art. 26.
206. Banco Santander Totta SA v. Companhia de Carris de Ferro de Lisboa SA [2017] 1
WLR at 1323, 1329 (Eng.).
207. Id. at 1331.
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mentioned that the force majeure clause from the CCPIT may have
some evidentiary value if the governing law is Chinese law. 208
Although England does not have such a certificate system, it is
possible that the place of performance could be in a country where
such certification is available despite the fact that English law is the
governing law. In Xiamen Jida Trade Development Company v.
Xiamen Chemical Raw Material Wholesale Co., Ltd., 209 the
Intermediate People's Court of Xiamen City, Fujian Province
accepted the force majeure defense, relying on a force majeure
certificate issued by a Paris trade association which was verified
by the CCPIT, notwithstanding that the governing law was
apparently Chinese law.210 This suggests that Chinese courts may
be more willing to consider force majeure certificates as evidence,
regardless of the governing law. It must be noted, however, that
this case was decided in 1995 and might not be representative of
contemporary judicial practice in China.
It is difficult to see English courts adopting the same liberal
position regarding the CCPIT certificate. Under English law, the
proof of foreign law is a matter of fact to be established by expert
testimony.211 The English court will not accept the force majeure
certificate by itself without a foreign law expert presenting and
interpreting the certificate.212 Even if Chinese law is the applicable
law, English courts are unlikely to consider a CCPIT certificate as
conclusive evidence of Chinese law. This was the position taken by
the US Supreme Court, which rejected the claim that a statement of
law provided by the PRC Ministry of Commerce should be binding
on the interpretation of Chinese law in US courts. 213 If the
governing law is English law, given the difference between the
substantive laws on force majeure described above, the evidentiary
value of a certificate provided by a foreign non-governmental
organization is doubtful. The CCPIT also did not conduct much
208. See supra Part II.
209. Xiàmén shì jí dá màoyì fāzhǎn gōngsī sù xiàmén huàgōng yuánliào pīfā gōngsī
fǎnhuán gòuxiāo hétóng dìngjīn àn (厦门市集达贸易发展公司诉厦门化工原料批发公司返
还购销合同定金案) [Xiamen Jida Trade Dev. Co. v. Xiamen Chem. Raw Material Wholesale
Co., Ltd.], (Interm. People’s Ct. of Fujian Province 1995) (China).
210. Id.
211. See DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 18, at 318.
212. See BRIGGS, supra note 194, at 99.
213. Animal Science Products v. Hebei Welcome, 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018).
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investigation beyond reviewing relevant documents submitted by
one contracting party online.214
D. Judicial Practice of Choice of Law
Thus far, the focus has been on the analyses of the more
technical private international law rules. However, given the
national interests in COVID-19 cases, there may be a motivation for
courts to apply choice of law rules in such a way that, aside from
the technical analysis above, the forum’s substantive law is to be
applied. This is particularly a possibility for Chinese courts as they
have long been following a “homeward trend” in applying Chinese
law. 215 To assess this potential manipulation, the Author
conducted a survey on choice of law cases of the Chinese courts.
The Author did not conduct a similar study on English cases due to
the limited amount of relevant decisions. 216 The findings are set
out below.
1. Pandemic-Related Force Majeure Cases
Although China has experience dealing with SARS, there were
only two reported cases regarding SARS-related force majeure that
also have an international element: 217 J.PI Travel U.S.A., Inc. v.

214. See Press Office of the General Conference Office Liu Yue, The issue force majeure
factual proof to help enterprises maintain their legitimate rights and interests, CHINA
COUNCIL FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Feb. 16, 2020),
http://www.ccpit.org/Contents/Channel_4324/2020/0216/1240959/content_1240959
[https://perma.cc/3MFH-YBPS].
215. See, e.g., TANG ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 227-28
(2016).
216. Search on Westlaw only identifies four cases that deal with force majeure and
conflict of laws: Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v The Crédit Lyonnais [1884] 12 QBD 589 (Eng.);
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co [1989] QB 728 (Eng.) (holding that the US
presidential order had not discharged the parties from further performance of the contract
and therefore the contract had not been frustrated); Canary Wharf (BP4) T1 Ltd. v.
European Medicines Agency [2019] EWHC (Ch.) 335 (Eng.); Banco Santander Totta SA v.
Companhia de Carris de Ferro de Lisboa SA [2017] 1 WLR 1323 (Eng.). All of them have
English law as the governing law. However, the sample size is too small to warrant
meaningful empirical analysis.
217. The cases are identified in Lawinfochina by the search terms SARS (“fēi diǎn”),
foreign-related (“shèwài”), and force majeure (“Bùkěkànglì”). There is no such case in
England.
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Yangtze River Shipping Overseas Tourism Corporation; 218 and
Huizhou Air China Automobile Trading v. Guangxi Airlines. 219 In
both cases, the Chinese courts applied Chinese law. In the former
case there was a governing law clause in favor of Chinese law.220 In
the latter case found Chinese law was the law with the closest
connections.221 However, despite the fact that these were the most
relevant cases on coronavirus and force majeure, the sample size is
too small for meaningful analysis. There is one international case
that involved another epidemic: the aforementioned Chu Xiang v.
Ni Keke labor contract dispute.222 However, despite the fact that the
place of performance of the contract was Angola, thereby making
the contract a foreign-related contract, the Chinese court simply
applied Chinese law with no discussion of choice of law. 223 This
shows that Chinese courts do not always conduct choice of law
analysis even if there is a foreign element.
2. Force Majeure-Related Cases
The next batch of cases surveyed consists of force majeurerelated cases with a conflict element. The Author only surveyed
cases decided after the Choice of Law Act came into effect in 2011

218. Měiguó dōngjiāng lǚyóu jítuán gōngsī (J) yǔ chángjiāng lúnchuán hǎiwài lǚyóu
zǒng gōngsī chuánbó zūlìn hétóng jiūfēn shàngsù àn (美国东江旅游集团公司（J）与长江
轮船海外旅游总公司船舶租赁合同纠纷上诉案) [Appeal Case for Ship Leasing Contract
Disputes between J.PI Travel U.S.A., Inc. and Yangtze River Shipping Overseas Tourism
Corporation], (Higher People’s Ct. of Hubei Province 2007) (China).
219. Shànghǎi èr zhōng yuàn shūlǐ guānyú 2003 nián-2019 nián gèdì shè yìqíng
hétóng jiūfēn 10 dà diǎnxíng ànlì zhī bā: Huìzhōu mǒu gōngsī, lián mǒu yǔ guǎngxī mǒu
gōngsī zūlìn hétóng jiūfēn àn (上海二中院梳理关于 2003 年-2019 年各地涉疫情 合同纠
纷 10 大典型案例之八:惠州某公司、连某 与广西某公司租赁合同纠纷案) [Huizhou Air
China Auto. Trading v. Guangxi Airlines], at 1-6 (Shanghai Second Interm. People’s Ct.
2007).
220. Měiguó dōngjiāng lǚyóu jítuán gōngsī (J) yǔ chángjiāng lúnchuán hǎiwài lǚyóu
zǒng gōngsī chuánbó zūlìn hétóng jiūfēn shàngsù àn (美国东江旅游集团公司（J）与长江
轮船海外旅游总公司船舶租赁合同纠纷上诉案) [Appeal Case for Ship Leasing Contract
Disputes between J.PI Travel U.S.A., Inc. and Yangtze River Shipping Overseas Tourism
Corporation], (Higher People’s Ct. of Hubei Province 2007) (China).
221. The court highlighted only the China-related factors as Chinese courts often do
in applying the closest connection test.
222. Chǔ xiáng sù níkēkē láowù hétóng jiūfēn àn (储翔诉倪珂珂劳务合同纠纷案)
[Chu Xiang v. Ni Keke Labor Contract Dispute], (People’s Ct. of Xuanwu Dist., Nanjing City,
Jiangsu Province 2015) (China).
223. Id.
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to reflect the judicial practice of the current regime. The survey
identified 45 such cases.224
Table 1
Governing law (China)

Governing law (Foreign)

45

0

Table 2
Choice of law approach
Choice of
law clause
2

Express
choice at
trial
6

Closest
connection
37

Total
45

As shown in Table 1, the Chinese courts did not apply foreign
law in any foreign-related force majeure case and invariably
applied Chinese law. This is the case regardless of the choice of law
approach adopted by the court, as displayed in Table 2. In three of
the six cases where the parties agreed to apply Chinese law at trial,
there was an express choice of law clause designating a foreign law
as the governing law. However, the parties decided to use Chinese
law at trial instead.225
224. The cases are identified in Lawinfochina by using the following search terms:
force majeure (“Bùkěkànglì”), “Article 41 of the Choice of law Act” (“Shèwài mínshì shìyòng
fǎ dì sìshíyī tiáo”) and “Article 117 of CCL” (Zhōngguó hétóng fǎ dì yībǎi yīshíqī tiáo”).
225. Kāngkǎi pǔ gǔfèn yǒuxiàn gōngsī yǔ duōyuán huánqiú shuǐwù mó kējì (běijīng)
yǒuxiàn gōngsī guójì huòwù mǎimài hétóng jiūfēn yīshěn mínshì pànjuéshū (康凯普股份
有限公司与多元环球水务膜科技（北京）有限公司国际货物买卖合同纠纷一审民事判决
书) [Concap Co. v. Duoyuan Glob. Water Membrane Tech. (Beijing) Co.], (Beijing Daxing
Dist. (Cnty.) People’s Ct. 2016); Duōyuán huánqiú shuǐwù mó kējì (běijīng) yǒuxiàn gōngsī
yǔ kāngkǎi pǔ gǔfèn yǒuxiàn gōngsī guójì huòwù mǎimài hétóng jiūfēn èrshěn mínshì
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It must be recognized that none of these cases involved
diseases or pandemics, so they cannot be evidence that the Chinese
courts prefer to apply Chinese law in pandemic-related conflict
cases. They do, however, confirm the homeward trend of the
Chinese courts generally in force majeure cases. This homeward
trend is further corroborated by the following survey on the
general choice of law practice in contract cases by Chinese courts.
3. Anglo-American Cases in 2018
Table 3 below identifies 170 contract cases decided by
Chinese courts in 2018 that have a foreign factor relating to either
England or the United States. 226 They are not, however, force
majeure-specific.
Table 3
Chinese law

US law

168

2

English law
0

Others

Total

0

170

The data shows that Chinese courts applied Chinese law in all
but two cases (1.2%). This greatly supports the “homeward trend”
observation. Although it is not the purpose of this Article to analyze
the reasons for such trend,227 the non-application of foreign law
can be attributed to the following reasons: first, most sophisticated
international transactions involving China will opt for
pànjuéshū (多元环球水务膜科技（北京）有限公司与康凯普股份有限公司国际货物买卖
合同纠纷二审民事判决书) [Duoyuan Glob. Water Membrane Tech. (Beijing) Co. v. Concap
Co.], (Beijing Second Interm. People’s Ct. Mar. 29, 2018); Yúzhuōlóng yǔ zhūhǎi shì jìn hé
tiān qìng fángdìchǎn kāifā yǒuxiàn gōngsī shāngpǐnfáng xiāoshòu hétóng jiūfēn yīshěn
mínshì pànjuéshū (余卓隆与珠海市晋和天庆房地产开发有限公司商品房销售合同纠纷一
审民事判决书) [Yu Zhuolong v. Zhuhai Jinhe Tianqing Real Estate Dev. Co.], (Zhuhai
Hengqin New Dist. People’s Ct. Nov. 30, 2018) (China).
226. They are identified in lawinfochina by the search terms: contract (“Hétóng”),
foreign-related (“shèwài”), the United States (“měiguó”), and England (“yīngguó”).
227. The Author is working on a separate article on this very topic titled An Empirical
Review of China’s New Choice of law Regime: In Search of Clear Guidelines?.
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arbitration. 228 This leaves only small contract cases to litigation.
Due to the relatively insignificant size of these contracts,
contracting parties may not include a choice of law clause, leaving
these cases to the closest connection test under Article 41 of the
Choice of Law Act, which is more prone to manipulation (see
below).229 Even if the parties include a choice of law clause, the size
of the claim may not justify the expense of hiring a foreign law
expert to testify on foreign law. When no foreign law is pleaded,
Chinese law will likely be applied by default. 230 Perhaps more
importantly, pleading foreign law in China to the satisfaction of the
Chinese courts has proven to be difficult in practice.231 This could
cause the foreign parties to not plead foreign law, despite having
an express choice of law clause designating the foreign law.232 The
lack of reliance on choice of law clauses is in stark contrast with the
deference by English courts to the governing law clause, whether
under common law or the Rome regime.
Second, in the absence of choice by the parties, unlike the
detailed balancing exercise on all circumstances of the case by the
English courts, 233 Chinese courts tend to refer only to Chinarelated factors in their application of the closest connection test.234
As a result, the closest connection test under Article 41 always
points to Chinese law as having the closest connections with the
contract.
228. MICHAEL J. MOSER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA 2-4 (Michael Moser ed., 2012).
229. See Choice of Law Act, art. 41.
230. Choice of Law Interpretation I, art. 17.
231. See TANG, supra note 215, at 38.
232 . See Kāngkǎi pǔ gǔfèn yǒuxiàn gōngsī yǔ duōyuán huánqiú shuǐwù mó kējì
(běijīng) yǒuxiàn gōngsī guójì huòwù mǎimài hétóng jiūfēn yīshěn mínshì pànjuéshū (康
凯普股份有限公司与多元环球水务膜科技（北京）有限公司国际货物买卖合同纠纷一审
民事判决书) [Concap Co. v. Duoyuan Glob. Water Membrane Tech. (Beijing) Co.], (Beijing
Daxing Dist. (Cnty.) People’s Ct. 2016); Duōyuán huánqiú shuǐwù mó kējì (běijīng) yǒuxiàn
gōngsī yǔ kāngkǎi pǔ gǔfèn yǒuxiàn gōngsī guójì huòwù mǎimài hétóng jiūfēn èrshěn
mínshì pànjuéshū (多元环球水务膜科技（北京）有限公司与康凯普股份有限公司国际货
物买卖合同纠纷二审民事判决书) [Duoyuan Glob. Water Membrane Tech. (Beijing) Co. v.
Concap Co.], (Beijing Second Interm. People’s Ct. Mar. 29, 2018); Yúzhuōlóng yǔ zhūhǎi shì
jìn hé tiān qìng fángdìchǎn kāifā yǒuxiàn gōngsī shāngpǐnfáng xiāoshòu hétóng jiūfēn
yīshěn mínshì pànjuéshū (余卓隆与珠海市晋和天庆房地产开发有限公司商品房销售合同
纠纷一审民事判决书) [Yu Zhuolong v. Zhuhai Jinhe Tianqing Real Estate Dev. Co.], (Zhuhai
Hengqin New Dist. People’s Ct. Nov. 30, 2018) (China).
233. See, e.g., Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Crédit Lyonnais (1884) 12 QBD 589 (Eng.).
234. See King Fung Tsang & Jyh-An Lee, Unfriendly Choice of Law in FRAND, 59 VA. J.
INT’L L. 220, 281-83 (2019)(discussing how Chinese courts cherry picked only Chinese
related factor in a high profile case relating to FRAND licensing agreement).
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In short, because of the long-established practice of Chinese
courts applying Chinese law, it is unlikely that force majeure cases
will be any different. In fact, considering the socioeconomic
interests at stake in COVID-19 cases, it is even more likely that the
Chinese courts will apply Chinese law to these cases. Thus,
although the SPC did not officially make the Guidances mandatory,
the homeward trend in choice of law described above certainly
makes the Guidances mandatory in Chinese courts without having
to invoke the relevant mandatory rule doctrine. However, it is
important to note that the survey above is not suggesting that
foreign parties are likely to be prejudiced in their chances of
success in force majeure related cases. The data only suggests that
Chinese courts prefer their own law (and probably the notion of
justice embedded in Chinese law) over foreign law when
adjudicating force majeure cases. Assuming that the Chinese force
majeure rules best reflect the notion of justice of China, it is one
way that the national interests of China will be promoted.
4. Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Although choice of law seems to be the most important issue
in the force majeure context, a brief note on jurisdiction and
enforcement of foreign judgments is also warranted. The
applicable choice of law rules depend on the country where the
forum is located.235 This in turn is decided by jurisdictional rules.
China’s jurisdictional rules are generally extremely broad.236 While
it recently adopted a new set of forum non conveniens rules, their
applications are strictly limited to cases which have close to zero
connections with China. 237 Comparing the English forum non
235. See CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 23, at 7.
236. See TANG, supra note 215, at 59.
237. See Zuì Gāo Rén Mínfǎyuàn Guānyú Shì Yòng “Zhōnghuá Rén Míngònghéguó
Mínshì Sùsòng Fǎ” de Jiěshì (最⾼⼈⺠法院关于适⽤《中华⼈⺠共和国⺠事诉讼法》的解
释 ) [Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of the Civil
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China Fa Shi [2015] No. 5] (promulgated by the
Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 30, 2015, effective Feb. 4, 2015) Westlaw China, art.
532 [hereinafter Application of the Civil Procedure Law]. For forum non conveniens to
succeed, the case must fulfil the following conditions: (1) forum non conveniens must be
raised by the defendant; (2) there is no choice of court agreement selecting a Chinese court
as the competent court; (3) the case is subject to no exclusive jurisdiction of China; (4) the
case involves no interests of the nation, citizens, legal entities or other organizations in
China; (5) main facts in dispute in the case has not occurred within China, and the case
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conveniens regime, it is much more likely for the English courts to
decline jurisdiction in favor of a foreign forum. 238 This higher
chance of the assumption of jurisdiction enables Chinese courts to
apply Chinese law.
Even if the case is adjudicated in England, and an English court
applies English law, it does not mean that Chinese force majeure
law will necessarily be irrelevant. If the English judgment requires
enforcement in China, it is possible that the judgment’s
incompatibility with Chinese public policy will result in Chinese
courts refusing to enforce the judgment. 239 It is theoretically
possible that the English judgment could be rejected for violating
the public policy embedded in the Chinese force majeure law.
However, as discussed above, 240 Guidance III suggests that the
application of Chinese force majeure law is not mandatory. As such,
it is difficult to argue that a judgment resulting from an application
of law different from Chinese force majeure law is a violation of
Chinese public policy.
In practice, it is more likely that the enforcement of an English
judgment will be rejected for lack of reciprocity.241 To date, China
still does not have a consistent practice of enforcing foreign
judgments on the basis of reciprocity.242 While there has been at
least one case of successful recognition of a Chinese judgment in
England (Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV v. Bank of China

shall not be governed by Chinese law; (6) a foreign court has jurisdiction upon the case
and would try the case in a more convenient manner.
238. Under the test developed by the House of Lords in Spiliada Maritime Corp. v.
Cansulex Ltd., an English court shall normally decline the exercise of jurisdiction if there is
another available forum that is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the English
court to adjudicate the case, the court will normally grant a stay. See Spiliada Maritime
Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd. [1987] A.C. 460, at 478.
239. See Zhonghua Renming Minshisusongfa (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法) [Civil
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong. June 27, 2017, effective July 1, 2017), at art. 281-82.
240. See Choice of Law Act, Art. 6(3) and accompanying text.
241. See King Fung Tsang, Enforcement of Foreign Commercial Judgments in China,
14 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 262, 281 (2018) (discussing how China did not exercise reciprocity in
enforcement of English judgment, even though there was precedent of English court
enforcing Chinese judgment).
242. Id.
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Ltd), 243 Chinese courts have thus far denied the enforcement of
English judgments for lack of reciprocity.244
Comparatively, enforcement of a Chinese judgment in
England is much easier. As Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor has
shown, English law does not require reciprocity for recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgment. 245 The most important
requirement is that the deciding Chinese court took jurisdiction on
a basis that is acceptable to the English courts. 246 In Spliethoff’s
Bevrachtingskantoor, the jurisdiction requirement was satisfied as
the court found the Dutch seller had submitted to the Chinese
court’s jurisdiction voluntarily.247
A similar argument may be made on the public policy
exception under the New York Convention regarding foreign
arbitral awards.248 However, China has a much better track record
in terms of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and it is
unlikely that the argument will be successful under the New York
Convention generally.249

243. Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV v. Bank of China Ltd. [2015] 1 C.L.C. 651
(Eng.).
244. For the recent instances of enforcement of foreign judgments by China, see
Béligh Elbalti, Some Thoughts on the Sino-Japanese Reciprocal Recognition Dilemma in Light
of the Recent Developments in the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
China,
CHINA
JUST.
OBSERVER
(Jan.
12,
2020),
https://www.chinajusticeobserver.com/a/some-thoughts-on-the-sino-japanesereciprocal-recognition-dilemma-in-light-of-the%20recent-developments-in-therecognition-and-enf [https://perma.cc/SZP5-FK7P].
245. Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV v Bank of China Ltd [2015] 1 C.L.C. 651
(Eng.).
246. Id. at 684 (“Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (15th ed, 2012) (at
paragraph 14–055 and following) confirms that a fundamental requirement of recognition
of a foreign judgment in England at common law is that the foreign court should have had
jurisdiction according to the English rules of the conflict of law.”).
247. Id. at 684-85.
248. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art.
5(2)(b), June 7, 1959, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; see also GEORGE A. BERMANN, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 573 (2017) (“[The public policy defense] is
no different than most countries’ standards for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments.”).
249. See Tsang, supra note 241, at 290 tb. 9 (showing that Chinese courts have
enforced 87 of 118 arbitration awards); see also DICEY, MORRIS & COLINS, supra note 18, at
580 (advocating the public policy exception to be restricted to only to cases that
significantly implicate the state’s legitimate interests and concerns).
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5. An Illustration
To fully illustrate the impacts of the judicial practices on
choice of law, as well as jurisdiction and enforcement of judgment,
an example will be helpful. Suppose there is a supply contract
between a Chinese supplier in Guangzhou and an English buyer in
London. The supply was significantly delayed by the pandemic,
leading to a claim of damages by the buyer, and the raising of a
force majeure defense by the seller. The results of their dispute
resolution are shown by the table below:
Table 4
Choice of
law

Jurisdiction

Enforcement

Litigation in
China

Likely to
apply
Chinese law

Forum non
conveniens
unlikely

Fair chance of
enforcement in
England

Litigation in
England

Depends

Forum non
conveniens
possible

Enforcement in
China unlikely

a. Litigation in China
If the litigation is to take place in China, it is highly likely that
the Chinese court will apply Chinese law due to its “homeward
trend.”250 This is particularly the case where there is no express
choice of law clause in the supply agreement. Although there will
be a higher chance of the application of English law if there is a
choice of law clause designating English law as the governing law,
its application by the Chinese courts is uncertain.251 Chinese courts
are also unlikely to decline jurisdiction, as its rule on forum non

250. See TANG, supra note 215.
251. See id. at 38 and accompanying text.
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conveniens is highly stringent. 252 Here, the fact that the case
involves a Chinese seller is sufficient to defeat a forum non
convenience claim.253 If the Chinese seller prevails under Chinese
force majeure law, the resulting Chinese judgment will likely be
enforced by the English court, since the initiation of the proceeding
by the English buyer in China will be regarded as a submission to
the Chinese court’s jurisdiction, thereby satisfying the jurisdiction
requirement.254
b. Litigation in England
Whether the English court will apply English or Chinese law
in this case depends on the facts of the case. Clearly, if there is a
choice of law clause, an English court will likely follow the law
specified in the clause.255 Whether the English court will decline
jurisdiction under the principle of forum non conveniens also
depends on the facts. However, even if the English court applies
English law and does not decline jurisdiction, Chinese courts will
likely not enforce the resulting judgment due to the lack of
reciprocity. This is particularly significant if the English buyer
prevails in the English court and the Chinese buyer has no assets
in England. In that case, the only alternative for the English buyer
is to sue the Chinese seller again in China, which will then repeat
the analysis of scenario (a) above. Thus, the Chinese private
international law regime will amplify the effects of Chinese force
majeure law regardless of the forum.
IV. CONCLUSION
COVID-19-related force majeure cases cannot be analyzed
without consideration of private international law, given its
252. See Application of the Civil Procedure Law, at art. 532 and accompanying text.
253. See Application of the Civil Procedure Law, at art. 532(4).
254. Schibsby v. Westenholz [1870] LR 6 QB 155, 161 (Eng.). For further details on
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under English law, see DICEY,
MORRIS & COLINS, supra note 18, at ch. 14. The jurisdiction requirement will be more
difficult if it is the Chinese party who initiated the proceeding. In that case, for jurisdiction
to be satisfied, the English party must be “present” in China, either through setting up a
place of business in China or having entered into a transaction through an agent with such
presence. See Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC [1989] 7 WLUK 355(Eng.). Alternatively, if there
is a jurisdiction clause designating the Chinese court as a forum, it will apparently be
sufficient.
255. Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. [1939] UKPC 7 (Eng.).
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international nature. These cases brought unprecedented conflict
issues because of the public and national interests present in
COVID-19. They trigger those private international law rules
regarding public policy and mandatory rules that are not usually
part of the analysis of force majeure cases. Although this Article
focuses on the interactions of these private international law
issues between China and England, many of the private
international law issues this Article highlights will also be present
in force majeure cases involving other countries.
In connection with the Sino-British conflict cases, the
differences in the substantive laws on force majeure make the
choice of law analysis outcome determinative. In particular,
although Chinese law does not give the COVID-19-specific
Guidances the status of a mandatory law, prior judicial practices in
China suggest that Chinese courts would most likely apply Chinese
law under the judicial practice of the Chinese courts. The difficulty
of enforcing English judgments in China discourages litigation in
England and further reduces the chances of applying English force
majeure law. Chinese private international law therefore in effect
maximizes the chance that Chinese force majeure law applies in
COVID-19-related cases, thereby promoting Chinese national
interests. These national interests perhaps always exist in the
background of private international law, though COVID-19
probably brings them out more prominently. It will be interesting
to see if future COVID-19 force majeure litigation will manifest
these national interests.
Hopefully, the analysis set out in the Article will help parties
of international contract anticipate conflict issues and resolve their
disputes efficiently. The greater wish of the Author, however, is for
this pandemic to end by the time of the publication of this Article
and for our world to return to normal.

